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v. 
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a foreign corporation, 
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JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 25, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 910476 
Priority No. 16 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an action for collection of trust assets. It 
was tried in the district court, and an appeal was taken to the 
Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Rep. Vol. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. May a plaintiff who elects to file an amended 
complaint substituting a new plaintiff, pursue an appeal of the 
dismissal of her original complaint. 
2. Does a beneficiary suing in a representative 
capacity for a trust have standing to assert claims which 
previously have been asserted by the trustee and dismissed as 
time-barred. 
3. Is a beneficiary the proper party to commence an 
action against third parties for collection of trust assets 
allegedly distributed improperly from the trust, when there is no 
allegation the trustee has been asked and has refused to bring 
the action or when there is no allegation the alleged 
distribution was a fraud committed by the trustee. 
4. Are plaintiff's claims time-barred if the 
complaint was filed in 1991 and, on the face of the complaint, 
injury allegedly occurred in 1980 and there are no allegations of 
tolling. 
5. Is the statute of limitations tolled for a cause 
of action by a trust against a third party when the trustee is 
under no legal disability to bring suit. 
Standard for Review 
When reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to 
dismiss, the Supreme Court need not give particular deference to 
the trial court's conclusions of law, but will review them for 
correctness. However, the Court will endeavor to uphold the 
trial court's ruling even if it must consider alternative grounds 
on which the trial court did not rely. O'Neal v. Division of 
Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991). 
If a motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for 
summary judgment, the Court will view the facts in the light most 
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favorable to the losing party. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, 
Inc.. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). 
LAW DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
There are no specific constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Nature of the Case 
This is an action for collection of trust assets. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Anna Lee Anderson filed her complaint on December 6, 
1990, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Utah. On April 15, 1991, defendants Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. 
On July 22, 1991, an amended complaint was filed by 
David M. Dudley, a newly substituted plaintiff. Dean Witter and 
Ralph Pahnke moved to dismiss the amended complaint. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The district court granted both motions to dismiss. 
The original complaint was dismissed on September 16, 1991; the 
amended complaint was dismissed on September 27, 1991. Anna Lee 
Anderson appealed; David Dudley did not. 
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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background Information 
Norman Anderson and his wife, Anna Lee, both created 
identical trusts in 1978, each naming the other as primary 
beneficiary. They appointed their only child, James, to serve as 
trustee for both trusts, R.152. In 1979, Norman died, and James 
Anderson assumed his duties as trustee of the Norman Anderson 
Trust. R.152. 
The Trust assets consisted almost exclusively of shares 
of stock. The shares were held in a brokerage account in the 
Salt Lake City branch office of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. R.147 
In May, 1980, the stock was distributed from the Trust's account, 
some going into James' personal account with Dean Witter and some 
going into his mother's personal account there, too. R.147, 
Exhibit A; 152-154. Ralph Pahnke was the Dean Witter account 
executive for the transaction. R.147. 
Claims of the Parties 
On December 6, 1990, Anna Lee Anderson filed an action 
against Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah. R.la. She brought 
the action solely in her position as the beneficiary of the 
Norman Anderson Trust. She contended the distribution of the 
stock violated the allocation scheme set forth in the Trust 
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instrument, improperly giving to her son shares which should have 
remained in trust for her benefit. She demanded money damages. 
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss 
on April 15, 1991. R.40. They claimed actions to recover trust 
assets must be brought by the trustee, not by the beneficiary. 
On July 16, 1991, the district court issued a minute entry, 
granting the motion and dismissing Anna Lee's complaint. R.91. 
On July 22, 1991, before the district court had entered 
the order of dismissal, an amended complaint was filed. R.92. 
Anna Lee was replaced as the named-plaintiff by David M. Dudley. 
Mr. Dudley had recently been substituted as the trustee of the 
Trust in place of Anna Lee's son, James. R.92,154. Dean Witter 
and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Dudley's amended 
complaint on August 7, 1991. R.139. They contended Mr. Dudley's 
claims were time-barred because the complaint alleged the stock 
distribution occurred in May 1980 and the action had been filed 
in December 1990, over ten years later. 
In opposition to the motion, Mr. Dudley filed 
affidavits from Anna Lee and her son, James. R.146-150,151-156. 
James admitted in his affidavit that he had signed a letter, 
which was given to Dean Witter, authorizing the distribution of 
stock from the Norman Anderson Trust brokerage account. 
R.147,f5. He claimed, however, he "never questioned the 
propriety of the transfers" and was "entirely unaware the 
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transfer violated the specific terms of the Norman Anderson 
Trust." F.147,555-6. Moreover, he admitted he was not 
sophisticated, he was inattentive to his trustee's duties, and he 
failed to communicate with his mother: 
In addition, given my lack of sophistication in acting 
as a Trustee and fiduciary, I admittedly did not fully 
understand and appreciate my duties to the Beneficiary. 
Consequently, I never disclosed the transfer of these 
assets to the Beneficiary. 
R.147,f6. He claimed he had not become aware of the alleged 
impropriety of the transfer until December, 1990 when he happened 
to find Trust papers. R.233-234. He gave them to his mother, 
who stated in her affidavit that she had no knowledge of the 
distribution before then. R.154-155. Neither Anna Lee nor David 
Dudley claims the transfer was fraudulent, and they make no claim 
against James. R.237. Mr. Dudley used the affidavits to support 
his argument that the statute of limitations had been tolled 
until Anna Lee's "discovery11 of the distribution in 1990. On 
September 16, 1991, the district court orally granted the motion 
to dismiss at the close of the hearing. R.218-221. 
The district court signed an Order on September 16, 
1991, dismissing Anna Lee's complaint. R.214-216. It signed 
another Order on September 27, 1991, dismissing David Dudley's 
amended complaint. R.218-221. 
On October 9, 1991, Anna Lee filed a notice of appeal. 
R.224-225. Mr. Dudley did not appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Anna Lee is no longer a party to the present action, 
having elected to replace herself as the plaintiff with the 
successor trustee. Since David Dudley has not appealed his 
dismissal, there is no action to pursue on appeal. Anna Lee 
cannot pursue, in a representative capacity for the Trust, claims 
which were dismissed against the trustee as time-barred. 
Anna Lee has not pleaded facts which allow her to claim 
an exception from the general rule giving the trustee exclusive 
authority to pursue this action. Her argument, raised for the 
first time on appeal, that James breached his duty to the Trust 
and that Dean Witter and Pahnke knowingly participated, is not 
cognizable by the Court. It is also in direct contradiction with 
James Anderson's affidavit, Anna Lee's argument in the district 
court and her election to amend her complaint, not to add those 
very allegations but to substitute the trustee as the party 
plaintiff. 
When a cause of action vests in a trustee, the statute 
of limitations commences to run, and if the trust's claim is lost 
by the neglect of the representative to sue, the beneficiary is 
barred. James Anderson knew or should have known he had an 
alleged cause of action in 1980. The action was filed in 1990, 
however, and it is time-barred. 
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If the trustee collaborates with a third party to 
misappropriate trust property, the statute of limitations is 
tolled in favor of the beneficiary. There is no evidence or 
suggestion James Anderson, as trustee, knowingly acted with 
anyone to breach the terms of the Norman Anderson Trust. The 
statute of limitations was not tolled; it expired before suit was 
filed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ANNA LEE IS NO LONGER A PARTY TO THIS ACTION AND THE TRUSTEE 
DID NOT APPEAL HIS DISMISSAL. 
The district court's Order of September 16, 1991, 
dismissed Anna Lee's complaint on the ground her claims to 
recover Trust assets belong to the trustee. Before then, Anna 
Lee had filed an amended complaint, allowing David Dudley, the 
successor trustee to James, to be substituted as the sole 
plaintiff in the action. Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke moved to 
dismiss the amended complaint. The motion was granted by the 
trial court in an Order of September 27th, on the ground the 
trustee's claims are barred by the expiration of limitations. 
The trustee did not appeal; the only notice of appeal was filed 
by Anna Lee. 
Anna Lee is no longer a party to the action in the 
district court. Her decision to amend the complaint and 
substitute the trustee as the plaintiff is binding on her. The 
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amended complaint, its parties and causes of action, filed 
voluntarily and as a matter of right by Anna Lee, supersedes the 
original complaint. "The law is overwhelming to the effect that 
when an amended complaint, complete in and of itself, is filed, 
the former complaint is functus officio and cannot be used for 
any purpose." Teamsters v. Motor Cargo, 530 P.2d 807, 808 (Utah 
1974). In DiPasquale Construction Corporation v. Wolfgang 
Zinnert. 539 A.2d 618, 620 (Conn. App. 1988), the Court of 
Appeals of Connecticut described the choices available to a party 
whose action has been dismissed, and the legal effect of electing 
to amend a complaint rather than appeal: 
[W]hen a court grants a motion to strike an entire 
pleading the losing party may take one of two courses 
of action. He may amend his pleadings, or he may stand 
on his original pleadings, allow judgment to be 
rendered and appeal. . . . The filing of the amended 
pleading is a withdrawal of the original. If a party 
chooses to amend its pleadings, then challenges to the 
rulings made on those original pleadings are wholly 
foreclosed. 
(citations omitted). See, also, Larkin v. Sanelli. 572 N.E.2d 
1145 (111.App. 1 Dist. 1991); Priddv v. Jones. 567 A.2d 154 
(Md.App. 1989). 
Anna Lee's appeal is deficient, too. She was not a 
party to the Amended Complaint and, for that reason, she cannot 
appeal its dismissal on the ground of limitations. 
The district court issued its minute entry on July 16, 
1991, noting its decision to dismiss Anna Lee's complaint. From 
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that moment, Anna Lee could have moved to amend her complaint to 
include allegations to allow her to claim an exemption from the 
general rule prohibiting the beneficiary from suing. She did 
not. She also could have appealed the dismissal. She did not. 
Instead, she elected to remove herself as plaintiff and allowed 
the successor trustee to file an amended complaint as the new 
party plaintiff. Other than the appearance of a new plaintiff, 
the substantive allegations in the amended complaint were 
identical to these in the original complaint. Effectively, then, 
she voluntarily relinquished her right, if any, to pursue the 
action and she entrusted the prosecution of the Trust's claims to 
the trustee himself. She has no right to appeal. 
Even if she were allowed to pursue an appeal of her 
dismissal, there is no remaining cause of action. The trustee's 
claims, identical to Anna Lee's, were dismissed. The filing of a 
notice of appeal is jurisdictional and by not pursuing an appeal, 
David Dudley, in his position as trustee, lost all right for the 
Trust to challenge dismissal of the trustee's action on any 
ground. Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981). Since Anna 
Lee is only bringing Trust claims, and since the trustee's 
identical claims have been dismissed without appeal, the Trust 
has no claims extant. 
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II. ANNA LEE CANNOT PURSUE THE PRESENT ACTION. 
A. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT COME WITHIN ANY EXCEPTION TO THE 
GENERAL RULE THAT ONLY THE TRUSTEE, AND NOT ANNA LEE, 
CAN BRING THE PRESENT ACTION. 
1. Exceptions to the General Rule. 
Anna Lee correctly identifies the prevailing rule of 
law: "[S]tanding to sue third parties to assert the prerogatives 
of a trust lies solely with the trustees, not with a 
beneficiary." Edaeworth v. First National Bank of Chicago, 677 
F. Supp. 982, 990 (S.D. Ind. 1988)(footnote omitted). Only the 
trustee can sue for the trust. 
The limited exceptions to the general rule have been 
categorized as follows: (1) Actions by beneficiaries against 
trustees directly (most often for accounting or for breach of 
fiduciary duty); and, (2) Actions by beneficiaries against third 
parties where either (a) the trustee is unable or has refused to 
act against the third party, or (b) the trustee has committed a 
breach of fiduciary duty and the third party knowingly 
participates in the breach. Section 282 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts (1976), quoted by Anna Lee in her brief, is 
simply a recognition of these exceptions. 
All of the cases cited by Anna Lee for the proposition 
that she personally can maintain the present action fall within 
one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule. Most of 
the cases involved actions by beneficiaries against trustees, 
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including Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Lesman, 186 111.App.3d 
687, 542 N.E.2d 824 (111. App. Ct. 1989); Fortune v. First Union 
National Bank, 323 N.C. 146, 371 S.E.2d 483 (1988); Edgeworth v. 
First National Bank of Chicago, 677 F. Supp. 982 (S.D. Ind. 
1988); Alioto v. U.S.. 593 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1984); 
Reynolds v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery. N.A.. 471 So.2d 
1238 (Ala. 1985); and, Velez v. Feinsteinf 87 A.D.2d 309, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). Hovle v. Dickinson, 155 
Ariz. 277, 746 P.2d 18 (1987), involved an action by certain 
beneficiaries against other beneficiaries. The trustee is not a 
party to Anna Lee's action. 
Two of the cases, Edgeworth and Velez. also involved 
claims against third parties by a beneficiary (in addition to 
claims against trustees), but both courts noted the facts alleged 
fit squarely within one of the enumerated exceptions to the 
general rule. Thus, in Edgeworth, the court noted: 
In light of these recognized exceptions, the court 
holds that, to the extent that plaintiff's claims 
against the Victor Buff officers and directors are 
premised on their knowing participation in the alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty by co-trustees Patricia 
Letsinger and the Bank, the plaintiff has standing to 
assert the claims. 
677 F. Supp. at 991. Similarly, the court in Velez noted: 
Where a claim exists in favor of the trust (properly 
speaking, of the trustees in their trust capacity) 
against third persons and the trustees are under a duty 
to enforce that claim and have improperly and 
unjustifiably failed to do so, the beneficiaries may 
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bring a suit on behalf of the trust, analogous to 
stockholders' derivative suits on behalf of a 
corporation. 
677. F. Supp. at 114. Both cases simply note the universally 
recognized exceptions, none of which apply here. 
2. Anna Lee's Complaint Fails to Allege Facts 
Necessary to Come Within an Exception to the 
General Rule. 
The right of a beneficiary to sue on behalf of the 
trust, as opposed to the trustee, is a matter which the 
beneficiary must set out with particularity in the complaint. 
Velez at 114-15. Anna Lee has failed to do so, despite 
opportunities. 
On appeal, for the first time, Anna Lee asserts James 
breached his fiduciary duty to the trust. Anna Lee's complaint 
does not contain a single allegation regarding a breach by James. 
To the contrary, Anna Lee alleged that "[t]he distributions [from 
the Norman Anderson Trust were] induced by and affected by 
Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds . . . ." 
Anna Lee's Complaint, f 2 6;R.la. There is not a single word 
referring to James' involvement in the distribution. 
Anna Lee argues, incorrectly, there is an inference to 
be drawn from the complaint that James breached his duty and that 
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke knowingly participated in the 
breach. One of Anna Lee's own cases exposes the fallacy of her 
argument. In Velez beneficiaries made claims, on behalf of the 
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trust, against insurance companies and advisors. The court held 
the plaintiffs' allegations insufficient, noting: 
Indeed, far from alleging facts showing that the 
remaining trustees are somehow involved in a 
conspiracy to permit the insurance companies and 
insurance advisers to charge excessive premiums, 
commissions and fees, the complaint alleges over 
and over again that the trustees other than 
Feinstein were deceived by Feinstein and the 
insurance companies and insurance advisers. 
451 N.Y.S.2d at 115 (emphasis added). Anna Lee must plead the 
efforts taken to require the trustee to bring this action and her 
description must be with particularity, meeting the same pleading 
standard imposed by Rule 23.1 for shareholders in derivative 
actions. Id. 
The allegations against the third parties in Velez are 
strikingly similar to Anna Lee's allegations against Dean Witter 
and Ralph Pahnke. She claims, based on the Affidavit of James 
Anderson, that Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke deceived James into 
making the improper distributions from the Trust. Unfortunately 
for her, this means the trustee should have brought the action. 
He did not. She makes no allegation of her demand and the 
trustee's refusal to act, nor of the trustee's inability to 
act.1 
1
 Anna Lee cannot contend her trustee refuses or is unable 
to bring suit, because Jim did file suit as trustee for her in 
James N. Anderson and the Anna Lee Anderson Trust v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds. Inc., (Case No. 87C-483A; U.S. District Court for the 
District of Utah). R.152. 
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Anna Lee's complaint does not allege facts placing her 
within an exception to the general rule giving the trustee 
exclusive standing to pursue actions on behalf of the Norman 
Anderson Trust. Thus, the general rule applies, leaving the 
trustee as the only party who can sue. 
3. Anna Lee's Argument in the Trial Court and Her 
Substitution of the Trustee as the Plaintiff 
Highlight Her Inability to Come Within an 
Exception. 
When considering Anna Lee's belated argument on appeal 
that James breached his duty to the Trust, not only are the 
allegations of the complaint important, but so is her conduct: 
(1) in arguing the motion to dismiss in the trial court; and, (2) 
in following the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. 
Anna Lee did not argue in the trial court, as she does 
here, that James Anderson breached the Trust and that Dean Witter 
and Ralph Pahnke knowingly participated in the breach. She 
consistently argued James was their unwitting pawn and he 
unknowingly allowed them to violate the Trust's terms. She 
argues James' breach for the first time on appeal. This Court 
does not recognize issues raised for the first time on appeal. 
fl[T]o be considered on appeal, the record must clearly show that 
[the issue] was timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon . . . ." Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 
15 
(Utah 1983). "A matter is sufficiently raised if it has been 
submitted to the trial court and the trial court has had the 
opportunity to make findings of fact or law," James v. Preston, 
746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) (emphasis added). An issue 
has not been submitted to the trial court, if there is no factual 
showing or submission of legal authority, id. The trial court 
must rule on the precise issue sought to be raised on appeal. 
Franklin Financial, 659 P.2d at 1045; Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 
198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). This Court will not assume from a 
silent record that an issue was raised and decided. Franklin 
Financial, 659 P.2d at 1045. The party claiming error must make 
and compile a record which reflects its preservation of the issue 
for appeal. Id. 
Second, following the trial court's ruling on the 
motion to dismiss, Anna Lee had the opportunity to amend her 
complaint prior to the filing of a responsive pleading by Dean 
Witter and Ralph Pahnke. Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. She availed herself of that opportunity, not to 
assert James' breach of trust, but rather to substitute the 
successor trustee as plaintiff in the action. The trial court 
dismissed the trustee's complaint as being time-barred. The 
trustee did not appeal. 
Anna Lee's voluntary decision after the trial court 
ruled on the motion to dismiss is telling. Given the unfettered 
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right to amend, knowing from Dean Witter's memoranda the only 
methods by which she could claim the right to prosecute the 
action on behalf of the Trust, she did not seek to amend to add 
allegations of the trustee's breach and of Dean Witter7s and 
Ralph Pahnke's knowing participation. Rather, she elected only 
to allow the trustee to replace her as plaintiff. 
Anna Lee's argument in the district court and her 
election to substitute the trustee as plaintiff, are further 
evidence of her inability to plead facts sufficient to allow her 
to claim an exception from the general rule requiring the trustee 
to act. 
III. THE TRUSTEE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF HIS RIGHT TO BRING THIS 
ACTION MORE THAN TEN YEARS AGO. THE TRUST'S CAUSES OF 
ACTION ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The claims in the original complaint and in the amended 
complaint are based on contract, tort and fiduciary duty. Of all 
the possible periods of limitations which might apply to the 
claims, the longest is that allowed for suit on the breach of a 
written contract: six years. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) 
(1953). The original complaint, then, must have been filed 
within six years from May 8, 1980, the date on which the stock 
was distributed. It must have been filed no later than May, 
1986. It was not. The action was filed in December, 1990, and 
it is time-barred. 
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The allegations in the two complaints erected the 
limitations bar. To extricate himself, David Dudley found it 
necessary to argue the statute had been tolled,2 He filed two 
affidavits: one by Anna Lee and another by her son, James. 
In her affidavit, Arna Lee stated that she first 
learned of the 1980 stock distribution when she was reviewing 
Trust papers in 1990. Her knowledge, or lack of knowledge, is 
wholly irrelevant to determine whether the claims are time-
barred, however. The right to bring this action rested solely 
with the trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust. Thus, it is James 
Anderson, as former trustee, who must be charged with the 
responsibility of discovering and bringing the action, and it is 
against him (and any successor trustee) the statute of 
limitations runs. Any statute of limitations running against 
him, the trustee, also runs against the beneficiary. Interfirst 
2
 See, e.g., Eldridae v. Eastmoreland General Hospital. 88 
Or. App. 547, 746 P.2d 735, 736 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) ("When a 
complaint shows on its face that the period for bringing an 
action has run, the plaintiff, to avoid the bar, must plead facts 
sufficient to show that the delay is excused.11); Johnson v. 
Pullen, 207 Neb. 706, 300 N.W.2d 816, 818 (1981) ("A plaintiff 
who seeks to avoid the bar of the statute must plead facts to 
show the statute was tolled.11); Kincheloe v. Farmer. 214 F.2d 
604, 605 (7th Cir. 1954)("Plaintiff by the allegations of his 
complaint erected the limitation bar and it was his duty in order 
to extricate himself therefrom to plead any exceptions upon which 
he relied.") 
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Bank-Houston N.A. v. Quintana Petroleum Corp,, 699 S.W.2d 864, 
874 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).3 
Even assuming the statements in James Anderson's 
affidavit are accurate, his affidavit does not avoid the running 
of the statute. He admits having signed the 1980 letter of 
instruction authorizing the distribution of assets from the 
Norman Anderson Trust. R.147. His only defense is that he was 
"unaware that the transfer violated the specific terms of the 
Norman Anderson Trust." R.147. His admissions at least 
demonstrate he was negligent in performing his duties as trustee. 
He made a mistake. He did not defraud the Trust, or knowingly, 
intentionally conceal information from his mother. Had James 
simply been more attentive, he should have known in 1980 that the 
Trust had a potential cause of action against Dean Witter and 
Ralph Pahnke. The statute of limitations was not tolled; it 
began to run on May 8, 1980 and expired before this action was 
filed. 
Anna Lee contends the running of the statute of 
limitations against James Anderson as the original trustee, does 
not bar her and the successor trustee, David Dudley, from 
3
 The court held "the period of the statute of limitations 
should be computed from the time the trustee acquired his right 
to sue." Id. 
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pursuing this action. She relies on § 327 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts.4 
Anna Lee has misread the Restatement. The first 
paragraph of § 327 dictates dismissal: if the trustee is barred 
by the expiration of limitations from suing a third party, the 
beneficiary is barred, too. The second paragraph, the one relied 
upon by Anna Lee, does not apply to this action. It allows a 
beneficiary to pursue an action against a third-party even though 
the trustee is barred by limitations, if the trustee knowingly 
breached the trust and the third party knowingly participated in 
that breach. 
Anna Lee contends the stock distribution was improper, 
that it breached the Trust, and that Ralph Pahnke and Dean Witter 
4
 Section 327 reads: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if the trustee 
is barred by the Statute of Limitations or by laches from 
maintaining an action against a third person with respect to 
the trust property, the beneficiary is precluded from 
maintaining an action against the third person 
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a 
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from 
maintaining an action against him therefor, unless 
(a) the beneficiary is himself guilty of laches, 
or 
(b) a co-trustee who did not participate in the 
breach of trust, or a successor trustee knowing of the 
claim against the third person, fails to bring an 
action against him until he is barred by the Statute of 
Limitations or by laches. 
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knowingly participated in the breach. She specifically fails to 
allege — or even suggest — that her son, acting as trustee, 
knowingly participated in the alleged breach of Trust. Absence 
of that allegation fails to toll the statute of limitations. The 
very cases cited by Anna Lee (her brief at 36) prove the point. 
In each instance, the statute of limitations did not bar 
beneficiaries from suing third parties for misappropriation of 
trust assets only because the trustee himself had knowingly and 
intentionally breached the trust with the active association of a 
third party.5 Consider two of her authorities. 
5
 Anna Lee's string citation includes these cases: 
Hammons v. National Surety Co., 36 Ariz. 459, 287 P. 292 
(1930). The guardian/trustee (bank no. 1) of two minor children 
deposited their funds as a loan with bank no. 2 without 
authorization. The second bank was aware the transaction lacked 
authority. The children ultimately sued both banks. The court 
held the statute of limitations did not run against the 
beneficiaries and in favor of the trustee, and the third party 
who participated with the trustee to breach the trust could not 
pose the statute as a bar either. 
State Bank and Trust Co. v. Commercial Trust and Savings 
Bank. 300 111. App. 435, 21 N.E. 157 (1939). Public official 
collected taxes and deposited the collections in a local bank. 
The bank then permitted him to withdraw the town's funds and use 
them for his own purposes. Because the bank had assisted and 
participated with the official in the diversion of the funds, the 
statute of limitations was tolled until the city learned of the 
defalcation. 
American National Bank of Enid v. Crew. 191 Okla. 53, 126 
P.2d 733 (1942). Plaintiffs7 oil royalties were deposited over 
an eight year period into their escrow account at bank no. 1, and 
the bank was to hold them in trust and invest them in government 
securities. The bank periodically issued statements to 
plaintiffs showing their account activity. The bank's president 
(continued...) 
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The first is Skinner v. DeKalb Federal Savings & Loan 
Assn., 246 Ga. 561, 272 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga Sup. Ct. 1980). In 
that case a home was conveyed to a mother as trustee for her 
children in the course of a divorce proceeding. She subsequently 
sought to sell the home and her former husband intervened. A 
consent order was entered, requiring her to receive the proceeds 
as trustee for the children, requiring her to obtain a court 
order before invading the trust for any purpose, and requiring 
her to give the father notice of her intention to invade the 
trust. She sold the home and deposited in a bank the sale 
proceeds as trustee for the children. A short time later she 
obtained a loan from the bank, using the children's account as 
collateral. The loan documents were signed by her as an 
individual and not as trustee. Years later, she was replaced as 
5(...continued) 
embezzled plaintiffs7 money over the eight year period, in part, 
with the knowledge and assistance of a second bank. The statute 
of limitations was tolled against the second bank until 
plaintiffs learned of its involvement. 
Baldwin v. Toolin, 113 Vt. 53, 34 A.2d 117 (1943). 
Decedent's widow knowingly participated with the administrator to 
misappropriate assets of the estate in an effort to defeat estate 
creditors. The statute of limitations did not begin to run in 
favor of the heir and administrator (considered to be trustees) 
until the creditors (considered beneficiaries) knew of the 
conversion. 
Connelly v. Florida National Bank of Jacksonville, 120 So.2d 
647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). Executor of the estate 
personally owed money to a debtor of the estate. The executor's 
obligation to the debtor was treated as an offset against the 
debtor's obligation to the estate. And, an additional cash 
payment from the debtor was converted by the executor to his own 
use. The statute of limitations was tolled for the successor 
trustee until discovery. 
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trustee. The successor trustee, upon learning of the loans 
improperly secured by the children's funds, filed an action 
against the bank, alleging it had knowledge of the interest of 
the children in the trust accounts and knowledge of a breach of 
the trust by the mother. The bank moved to dismiss on the ground 
the applicable statute of limitations had run. The motion was 
granted, and subsequently reversed on appeal. In reversing, the 
court held the proper party to bring an action for a trust is the 
trustee, not, as Anna Lee suggests, the beneficiary: 
Since the minor children here have no interest in the 
trust assets apart from their interest as 
beneficiaries, any cause of action they have must be 
pursued by the trustee. 
272 S.E.2d at 262. Next, the court recognized the general rule 
that when the trustee is barred by the statute of limitations 
from pursuing a claim on behalf of the trust, the beneficiaries 
are barred also. The rule is otherwise, the court explained, 
only when the third party against whom the trust has a claim 
knowingly participated with the trustee in the breach of the 
trust. 
The second case is Jones v. Idaho. 91 Idaho 823, 432 
P.2d 420 (Ida. 1967). There, a mother held real property for her 
three minor children under a judicially created trust following a 
divorce. She had no authority to convey the property without 
first obtaining court approval. Nevertheless, she subsequently 
conveyed it to a third party without approval and she neglected 
to account for the proceeds of sale. Sometime later she was 
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replaced as trustee. The successor trustee learned of the 
transfer and filed an action against the buyers, who defended, in 
part, on the ground the suit was barred by the expiration of 
limitations. The trial court ruled for the buyers, and the 
judgment was affirmed on appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court openly 
endorsed the general rule that causes of action for wrongs 
against a trust are vested in the trustee and not in the 
beneficiaries. It wrote: 
The trustee has title, possession, and powers of 
administration. If a stranger trespasses upon real 
property comprising assets of the trust, the cause of 
action arises in favor of the trustee, and the running 
of the statute of limitations is controlled by the 
ability of the trustee to sue. The period begins to 
run when the trustee knows, or ought to know of the 
unlawful act. If the trustee is barred, the 
beneficiary is barred, notwithstanding the 
beneficiary's personal disability at the time the 
action arose. 
Id. at 424. The court also noted the general exception that the 
statute of limitations is tolled when the trustee and the third 
party knowingly participate together in a breach of the trust: 
Where the trustee collaborates with a third party 
transferee to defeat the trust, the theory that the 
trustee protects his beneficiary against wrongs 
committed by third persons to the res becomes 
unrealistic and unequitable in application. The 
trustee, far from acting to preserve the rights of the 
beneficiary, turns against the beneficiary and subverts 
his interest. Consequently, in most jurisdictions to 
consider the question, the general rule yields to this 
exceptional situation, and the statute of limitations 
does not run against beneficiaries under a personal 
disability where the trustee and third party transferee 
fraudulently violate the trust agreement; in the 
beneficiary's or successor trustee's action to recover 
the trust assets from the third party transferee, the 
statute of limitations is not a defense. 
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Id. at 425; emphasis added. The court explained the rationale 
behind the exception by referring to one of its prior decisions 
which, in turn, had examined the origins of the rule: 
The rule that the statute of limitations does not bar a 
trust estate holds only between cestui que trust and 
trustee, not as between cestui que trust and trustee on 
one side, and strangers on the other; for that would 
make the statute of no force at all, because there is 
hardly any estate of consequence without such trust, 
and so the act would never take place. Therefore, 
where the cestui que trust and his trustee are both out 
of possession for the time limited, the party in 
possession has a good bar against them both. 
Id. at 425. Anna Lee urges the Court to find the statute of 
limitations is tolled in circumstances when the trustee is under 
no legal disability and he has unknowingly breached his duties to 
the Trust. Her position is not recognized by law and if 
accepted, would undermine statutes of limitations by allowing 
tolling in a greater number of circumstances. 
There being no suggestion in the record that James 
knowingly participated in the alleged breach and no question of 
his capacity to sue on behalf of the Trust,6 his failure to 
bring suit bars both the beneficiary and the successor trustee. 
CONCLUSION 
Anna Lee Anderson has no right to bring this appeal; it 
should be dismissed. Alternatively, the Orders of dismissal 
should be affirmed. 
6
 Indeed not. Remember, it was James, as trustee, who 
filed another legal action for the Trust. 
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